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Do Corporate Tax Cuts Increase Investments?*

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Corporate taxes are considerable costs to investments that vary across corporations. For example, since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms, their effective tax rate and consequently their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. Thus, we expect that investment responses to a corporate tax cut are heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform that cut corporate taxes by 10 percentage points as an exogenous policy shock. We show in a matching difference-in-differences setting that domestically owned firms increased investments more than foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but have heterogeneous investment responses across firms.

Keywords: Corporate taxation, Investment

JEL Classification: G31, H24, H25

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1 Introduction

The effect of taxes on corporate investment is a key motivator for governmental reform strategies to boost domestic economy. For example, in February 2012, Barack Obama published the President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform, which suggested to “*reduce the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 28 percent. This reduction in the rate would put the United States in line with other advanced countries [and] help encourage greater investment in the United States.*”¹ In 2013, the Swedish government reduced corporate taxes to 22%, since a “*lower corporate tax rate will provide strong incentives for the business sector to increase its investments.*”² The 2008 German corporate tax rate cut from about 39% to 29%, which we exploit in this paper, was implemented to “*[increase] the German tax attractiveness for investments.*”³ This paper aims to test how corporate investment responds to such a large corporate tax cut.

Empirical evidence from firm-level data on the direct effect of the statutory corporate tax rate on investment is surprisingly rare. Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2010) analyze macro data from a cross section of 85 countries in 2004. They document a negative association of statutory corporate tax rates with aggregate investment. Auerbach (1983) uses macro data from the United States. Some studies (see, e.g., Summers, 1981; Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba, 1983; Auerbach and Hassett, 1992; Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1996; Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm, 2002) apply tax policy measures that combine tax rate and tax base elements using the q-approach. Other studies (e.g., Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer, 1999; Dwenger, 2014) implement the user cost of capital approach. One weakness of these studies is that tax rate and tax base elements such as depreciation allowances cannot be separated and that these studies typically do not exploit exogenous variation around large corporate tax rate cuts.

We argue that corporate taxes can have heterogeneous investment effects across firms. Corporate taxes are costs to investment that differ across firms. For example, some firms can

¹ See page 9 of The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform, A Joint Report by The White House and the Department of the Treasury, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf> (last accessed July 1, 2014.)

² See pages 20 and 21 of the Budget Statement from the Budget Bill 2013 in Sweden, available at <http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/20/39/65/8bd45b2b.pdf> (last accessed July 1, 2014).

³ This quote is from the legislation draft of the tax reform act from March 27, 2007, available at dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/048/1604841.pdf (also, Brandstetter, 2014, last accessed July 1, 2014).

take advantage of lower corporate tax rates abroad, for example, through profit shifting, and thereby reduce tax-induced investment costs. The literature documents (Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) that profit shifting activities vary considerably across firms and, consequently, so do tax-induced investment costs. We show empirically that investment responses to a cut in the statutory corporate tax rate differ between domestic and foreign firms.

There are three main challenges to studying the effect of corporate taxes on investment. First, one needs firm-level data on listed and unlisted firms, since the majority of firms in an economy are typically unlisted⁴. We use a large panel of over 36,000 listed and unlisted firms from Germany over the period 2004–2011 with information on the location of the ultimate shareholder. The second requirement relates to identifying tax rate variation that stems from a large policy change. Our identification strategy exploits a large policy shock that reduced corporate taxes from 39% to 29% in Germany. This is a sufficiently large tax cut to induce investment responses. Third, since this tax cut applies to all German corporations, our identification of the tax effect is based on a matching difference-in-differences approach. We compare domestically owned corporations to corporations where the ultimate owner is a foreign corporation.

The intuition behind our empirical identification strategy relates to differences in profit shifting opportunities across firms. Consider two firms with similar economic activity but different ownership structures. In contrast to a firm with a foreign parent corporation, a domestically owned corporation has no, or fewer, opportunities to shift income across borders. Even if domestic firms have subsidiaries abroad, multinationals shift profits toward the parent company rather than in the opposite direction (e.g., Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel, 2014). Therefore, we argue that domestically owned firms in Germany are less engaged in international profit shifting than firms with a foreign parent. Several empirical studies (e.g., Rego, 2003; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010) provide evidence that, due to cross-border profit shifting, firms with foreign operations have lower effective tax rates on corporate profits than firms without foreign operations. Thus, foreign firms are expected to

⁴ According to the Worldbank, over 95% of all firms are small and medium sized enterprises and they represent over half of the private sector employment (see, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CGCSRLP/Resources/SME_statistics.pdf, last accessed July 1, 2014).

have an effective tax rate below the statutory tax rate and below the tax rate of domestically owned firms. Since taxes impose significant costs to investments, the tax costs of foreign firms are lower than those of domestic firms. We argue that a cut in the statutory tax rate for all firms has heterogeneous effects across firms. The effective cut in corporate tax rates is larger for domestically owned firms than for foreign-owned firms. Using a simple model, we show that the tax sensitivity of investment is muted by the percentage of profits shifted abroad. Since the cost reduction around the 2008 corporate tax cut is larger for domestically owned firms, we expect their investments to respond more than the investments of corporations with a foreign parent.⁵

We first present graphical evidence on the difference in investments between domestically and foreign-owned firms. We observe a parallel trend in investments before the 2008 tax reform. In each pre-reform year, the difference in investments between domestically owned firms and corporations with a foreign parent is insignificant. Put differently, domestically and foreign-owned firms have similar investments before the tax reform in our matched sample. After the reform, domestically owned firms invest significantly more than firms with a foreign parent. The difference in investment is statistically significantly different from zero and persists over time. The effect is significant in each year following the tax rate cut. Our results suggest that corporate investments responded immediately to the tax cut.⁶

We then test our hypothesis in a difference-in-differences setting in which we compare the investment responses of domestically owned and foreign-owned German corporations around the 2008 reform. Our estimation includes firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and firm-level control variables. After profitability, debt, size, sales, wages, and loss firms are controlled for, the difference-in-differences estimate is significant and positive. That is, the 2008 tax reform increased the investment of firms whose ultimate owner is domestic relative to the investment of foreign-owned firms. A corporate tax cut of 10% has large investment effects on domestically owned firms. We find an increase of 5.9% in investment, equivalent to an average increase in

⁵ In contrast to Overesch (2009), who examines the effect of cross-country corporate tax rate differences on German inbound investments, we analyze heterogeneous investment responses across firms with domestic and foreign shareholders. The data employed by Overesch include only the inbound investments of foreign firms, whereas we empirically study the effect of corporate tax rates on the allocation of investment across firms in Germany.

⁶ In contrast, Dwenger (2014) focuses on the long-term effects of user costs on the capital stock. That model includes a long-term specification of a firm's demand for capital. Thus, it only allows an interpretation of long-run effects while misestimating short-run effects.

investments in fixed assets of €3.0m (or USD 4.2m) for each domestic firm, which averages total assets of €103m (or USD 142m).

We use several robustness tests to rule out the potential impact of the financial crisis: Our approach identifies tax effects through heterogeneous investment responses of domestically and foreign-owned firms. If the financial crisis affects the investment of foreign and domestic firms differently and in the same direction as the corporate tax rate cut, we would potentially interpret crisis effects as tax effects. We therefore use pseudo-reforms in 2008 for nine of the EU-15 member states.⁷ We find that, in contrast to Germany, there is a similar trend in the investments of domestic and foreign firms around the financial crisis in eight of these nine countries. The exception, Italy, cut its corporate tax by 5.5 percentage points in 2008. Finding a significant effect in Italy and Germany but in none of the other sample countries indicates that heterogeneous investment responses are due to large corporate tax rate changes and not due to the financial crisis.

Further, the effect of the tax reform in Germany is persistent over time, that is, the difference estimates are similar and statistically significant in all post-reform years. If the crisis explains the effect, we would observe a reversal of foreign investment in 2010 and 2011. Second, we include gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the home country of the foreign shareholder in our model. This test shows that the change in investments between domestic and foreign-owned firms is not driven by an economic downturn in the parent company's home country relative to the German GDP growth. Third, since we exclude companies that exit the sample in the post-reform period, potential differences in insolvency risk across domestic and foreign firms around the financial crisis do not bias the results. We conclude that the financial crisis cannot explain our findings. In addition, other reform elements of the 2008 tax reform could explain our results. However, we find that the small changes in the dividend taxation of non-corporate shareholders do not explain our results and neither does the temporary introduction of bonus depreciation in 2009 and 2010. We also obtain similar effects when using an alternative measure of investment that accounts for potential scaling differences.

⁷ We do not conduct the test for Denmark (data availability), Belgium (large tax reform in the pre-pseudo reform period), and countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Spain, and Portugal). Obviously, we do not use Germany since it is subject to our main analysis.

Our results have several implications. One main implication is that corporate taxes have large effects on investment decisions. The ongoing “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates affects not only the location decisions (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Buettner and Ruf, 2009; Overesch, 2009) and profit shifting activities of multinational firms (e.g., Clausing, 2003; Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme, 2008; Markle, 2011), but also investment decisions of both domestic and multinational firms. A corporate tax rate cut has heterogeneous effects on investment costs across domestically and foreign-owned firms and correspondingly affects the allocation of investments. In large economies with high tax rates, such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, there are many firms without foreign operations, since the domestic market is sufficiently large. Hence, countries may benefit from an increase in domestic investments by cutting corporate tax rates. Conversely, in countries with many internationally active firms and a small domestic market, investment responses to corporate tax changes may be lower than expected. Further, countries with a high share of foreign ownership can export part of their tax burden through a higher corporate tax rate (Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2006). Our results imply that a high corporate tax rate comes at the cost of lower investments by domestic firms.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of tax policy changes on investment. Recent stimulus packages and large tax reforms in OECD countries include corporate tax cuts, dividend tax cuts, and bonus depreciation allowances.⁸ Previous literature on the effectiveness of such provisions shows mixed results, however. While there is empirical evidence that payout taxes affect the allocation of investments across listed firms (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013), ambiguous findings are obtained for unlisted firms (e.g., Yagan, 2013; Alstadsæter and Jacob, 2014). In addition, evidence on the impact of bonus depreciation on corporate investment is mixed (e.g., House and Shapiro, 2008; Hulse and Livingstone, 2010).

⁸ Over the past decades, many OECD countries have substantially reduced the corporate tax rate: for example, the United States around the Tax Reform Act in 1986, Australia in 1987, Austria in 1988 and 2004, Denmark in 1990, Germany in 2001, Italy in 1997, Japan around 1998, New Zealand in 1987, Norway and Sweden in 1991, and the United Kingdom between 1983 and 1986. Large dividend tax cuts (more than 10 percentage points) were, for example, observed in the United States in 2003, in Belgium in 1995, in Japan in 2004, in the Netherlands in 2001, in Spain in 1999, and in Sweden in 2006 for closely held, unlisted corporations. In response to the recent financial crisis, many European Union countries (e.g., Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) implemented bonus depreciation schemes to increase corporate investment.

Our results show that corporate tax rate changes have heterogeneous effects across domestic and foreign firms and that investment by domestic firms responds strongly.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the institutional background and a simple investment model. Section 3 presents the data and our empirical estimation strategy. The empirical results and robustness tests are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 sets forth our conclusions.

2 Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development

2.1 2008 Tax Reform

The Business Tax Reform Act of 2008 constitutes the German government’s reaction to the demand for a new tax system to improve the country’s position in international tax competition. The reform comprised a corporate tax cut and tightening of rules against multinational profit shifting (tax base broadening). The statutory corporate tax rate was lowered from 25% to 15%. In combination with changes to the local business tax on corporations, this resulted in a decrease of the corporate tax burden by 10 percentage points (from about 39% until 2007 to 29% as of 2008). However, these provisions did not reduce overall levels of profit shifting to low-tax countries within multinationals (Brandstetter, 2014).

The interest barrier rule, which limits the deductibility of interest payments from taxable profits, was established as an instrument to constrain financing structures within multinational firms. This thin capitalization rule could have potential investment effects if the rule were binding and if it thereby could reduce access to debt to finance new investment. As Blaufus and Lorenz (2009) show, the German interest barrier, with its exceptions and escape clauses, is relevant only for very few firms. Hence, we believe that the thin capitalization rule does not affect our results since it is not binding for almost all firms in our sample.⁹

Another change within the 2008 reform was a slight increase in the dividend tax rate for individual, non-incorporated shareholders. According to the partial income method, 60% of dividend income—compared to 50% before the reform—is taxed at the shareholder’s personal income tax rate, which ranges from 0% to 45%. This small increase in the dividend tax rate

⁹ Based on the database *dafne* (the same database as used for this paper), Blaufus and Lorenz (2009) find that fewer than 200 firms are potentially affected by the German thin capitalization rule.

of zero to 4.5 percentage points for non-corporate shareholders could have, apart from any level effects, potential effects on the allocation of investments across firms (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013). Even though the evidence on this effect for unlisted corporations is mixed (e.g., Yagan, 2013; Alstadsæter and Jacob, 2014), we test the robustness of our results in Section 4.7 below to rule out that our results are driven by the small increase in the dividend tax.

2.2 Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment

We formulate a simple model that isolates the effect of a corporate tax rate reduction on investment. We argue that a corporate tax cut has heterogeneous investment effects across firms. Empirical evidence (e.g., Rego, 2003; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010) shows that firms with foreign operations have lower effective tax rates on corporate profits, and thus lower costs to investments. The degree to which firms have access to profit shifting across borders can therefore affect responsiveness to corporate tax changes. To illustrate this effect, we first consider a firm without the opportunity to shift profits. We then relax this assumption and allow profit shifting across borders.

We assume a one-period investment that yields a pre-tax return r . The return is subject to corporate taxation τ^{Corp} . This is the corporate tax rate in the country where the firm is located. The net of corporate tax return is distributed to the shareholder who is subject to dividend taxation τ^{Div} . We follow King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981) and assume that the investment is financed with internal funds.¹⁰ In sum, the net cash flow at $t+1$ equals $(1 + r(1 - \tau^{Corp}))(1 - \tau^{Div})$.

Alternatively, the firm could pay out the cash flow immediately. In this case, shareholders pay dividend taxes at a rate of τ^{Div} . The remaining cash flow is invested at an after-tax return of i . Comparing these two investment alternatives, the firm will invest in the project if

$$r^* = i \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \tau^{Corp}} \quad (1)$$

¹⁰ The implications of our simple model are similar when this assumption is relaxed. If we assume that the investment is financed with new equity (e.g., Harberger, 1962, 1966; Feldstein, 1970; Poterba and Summers, 1985), the relevant required rates of return increase by $\frac{1}{1 - \tau^{Div}}$ in both cases. As the dividend tax also changes slightly around the reform, we test in the robustness section whether this rate change has an effect. Our results suggest that the dividend tax rate change has no effect.

Equation (1) shows that the required rate of return for a corporate investment, r^* , is sensitive to changes in the corporate tax:

$$\frac{\partial r^*}{\partial \tau^{Corp}} = i \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \tau^{Corp})^2} > 0 \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) implies that a corporate tax cut will lower the required rate of return of an investment (r^*). Thus, we expect corporate investment to increase following a corporate tax cut. The underlying assumption of Equation (2) is that the firm has no access to multinational profit shifting and is subject to the domestic marginal tax rate on corporate profits of τ^{Corp} .

We next relax the assumption that a firm has no access to profit shifting. We again assume a one-period investment that yields a pre-tax return r . The return is subject to an effective corporate taxation, τ_{Eff}^{Corp} . This effective tax rate depends on the percentage of profits, α , shifted to a foreign country where profits are taxed at a rate τ_{For}^{Corp} . The remaining part of the profits, $(1 - \alpha)$, is taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate τ_{Dom}^{Corp} . We simplify the determination of the percentage of profits α shifted abroad and assume that α is exogenous. In the Appendix, we endogenize α and allow $\alpha(\cdot)$ to be a function of τ_{For}^{Corp} and τ_{Dom}^{Corp} . Since the implications of our model are similar in this case, we use the simplified version of the model to illustrate the effects. In sum, a firm with access to profit shifting invests in the project if

$$r_{Shifting}^* = i \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \tau_{Eff}^{Corp}} \quad (3)$$

with

$$\tau_{Eff}^{Corp} = \alpha \cdot \tau_{For}^{Corp} + (1 - \alpha) \cdot \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}$$

From Equation (3), we can derive the effect of a corporate tax change on the required rate of return of a firm with the opportunity to shift income:

$$\frac{\partial r_{Shifting}^*}{\partial \tau^{Corp}} = i \cdot (1 - \alpha) \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \tau^{Corp})^2} > 0 \quad (4)$$

If the domestic tax rate is reduced, the effect on the required rate of return of a firm with profit shifting opportunities, $r_{Shifting}^*$, is mitigated by the fraction of income shifted abroad.

Hence, as long as the firm does not shift any profits abroad, α equals zero and both firms with and without access to profit shifting will respond the same way. However, empirical analysis suggests that $\alpha > 0$ (e.g., Weichenrieder, 2009, for Germany). In this case, τ_{Eff}^{Corp} is smaller than τ^{Corp} if the foreign tax is below the domestic tax rate. Consequently, firms with the opportunity to shift income abroad are less responsive to changes in the corporate tax rate.

Equation (4) further implies that the effect of a change in the (domestic) corporate tax rate decreases with a higher degree of profit shifting (α close to one). In the extreme case that all profits are shifted abroad, firm investment will not respond to changes in the corporate tax rate at all. Generally, a difference in the investment response to the tax cut depends on α . Given similar economic activity, as long as domestically owned firms shift fewer profits abroad than firms with a foreign parent, investment responses to a tax cut are greater for domestic firms than for foreign firms. Profit shifting is biased towards shifting to the parent firm (Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel, 2014), and therefore more relevant for foreign-owned than domestically owned firms. These empirical observations translate into a lower α for domestic than for foreign firms. We thus formulate our main hypothesis as follows.

Hypothesis: Following a corporate tax cut, firms with limited profit shifting opportunities (*domestic firms*) will increase investments more than firms with more profit shifting opportunities (*foreign firms*).

3 Estimation Strategy and Data

3.1 Empirical Identification

We test our hypothesis in a difference-in-differences framework that compares the investments of domestic and foreign-owned German firms around the 2008 tax reform. The resulting estimation equation is

$$\begin{aligned}
 Inv_{i,t} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Domestic \times Reform + \beta_2 EBIT_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Sales_{i,t-1} \\
 & + \beta_4 Labor_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Debt_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 Loss_{i,t} + \beta_7 Ln(TA)_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where the investment of firm i in year t ($Inv_{i,t}$) is the dependent variable. The independent variable of interest is the interaction between *Domestic* and *Reform*, where *Reform* is a dummy variable equal to one for all the years after the tax reform (2008 to 2011). We define a German corporation as domestic if the enterprise's overall shareholder resides in Germany. The overall shareholder is defined as having a direct or indirect interest in the German affiliate of more than 50%. The country of the foreign overall shareholder is known; however, this more detailed information is not needed for the analysis.

This difference-in-differences approach identifies the investment effects of the reform on domestic firms vis-à-vis foreign firms. Thus, the interaction of *Domestic* and *Reform* captures differences in the level of investment between domestic and foreign companies after the 2008 tax reform. According to our hypothesis, corporate investment increases after the tax rate cut, but the effect is larger for domestic firms than for foreign firms. Thus, the β_1 coefficient is predicted to be positive. The identification of a causal effect of corporate taxes on investment is based on the assumption that the tax reform is the only event affecting relative investment of domestic and foreign firms around 2008. However, the financial crisis could potentially affect the difference between domestic and foreign firms. We present several robustness tests to rule out this alternative explanation in Sections 4.3 to 4.5.

There could be concerns that, besides ownership structure, potential differences in economic activities between the treatment group (domestic firms) and the control group (foreign firms) bias our results. To account for these differences, we use an exact one-on-one matching procedure without replacement before estimating Equation (5). Each foreign firm is matched to a domestic firm according to the natural logarithms of sales, wages, liabilities, and fixed and total assets of each pre-reform sample year. We additionally match on the industry code. This approach has two advantages. First, the reform does not affect assignment to the treatment or control group, since sorting and matching are based on pre-reform characteristics. Second, firms cannot enter the treatment or control group after the reform. This ensures that our results are not driven by new firms and their investments after the 2008 tax reform. We thus obtain two groups with the same number of firms prior to the reform that are comparable in firm size, asset structure, and leverage but that differ in ownership structure. We use the matched sample in addition to the full sample when estimating Equation (5).

We further include five firm-level control variables. The regression model controls for the influence of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), sales, labor costs, loss firms, and leverage on investment. The variable $\ln(TA)$, the natural logarithm of total assets, accounts for the size of the firm. We lag all firm-level control variables once to avoid an endogeneity bias. The model contains firm fixed effects to capture time-invariant firm-specific influences on levels of investment. Firm-fixed effects also control for differences in investments across industries. We include year fixed effects that account for the business cycle and other macroeconomic effects. Note that the inclusion of firm-fixed effects captures the main effect of *Domestic*, which is time-invariant. Likewise, the main effect of *Reform* is captured by year-fixed effects and is therefore not reported in our main specification. We base our statistical inference on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.

3.2 Data Sample and Summary Statistics

We use firm-level panel data from Bureau van Dijk’s *dafne* database. The database contains the data of German companies,¹¹ including financial data, as well as information about the company activity, branch, and ownership structure. Our sample consists of data from 36,072 corporations over the period 2004–2011, a total of 93,856 firm-year observations. Companies offering financial or insurance services are excluded. All the financial data we use are based on German accounting rules.

The data also include information on the location of the ultimate owner. We differentiate between domestic and foreign companies according to the primary place of business of the overall shareholder. We define the dummy variable *Domestic* as equal to one for companies with a German overall shareholder and zero otherwise.¹² The mean of *Domestic* equals 0.829 (see the summary statistics in Table 1). That is, the vast majority of enterprises in the sample are domestic. In the matched sample, 51% of firm-year observations stem from domestic firms.

¹¹ These cover limited liability companies with the German legal forms *Aktiengesellschaft*, *Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung*, and *Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien* (*KGaA*, *GmbH & Co. KGaA*, and *AG & Co. KGaA*), and other corporations. Small corporations are not included in our sample due to the lack of filing requirements.

¹² We have basic information about the ultimate owner, but we cannot identify the exact legal status. We assume profit shifting opportunities to be limited in the case of a foreign individual shareholder. This would drive the β_1 coefficient towards zero, since we would then expect similar reactions for both foreign and domestic firms. In an untabulated test, we restrict the sample to industrial firms. Results remain significant and of similar size. We are thus confident that this data limitation cannot drive any positive findings on relative investments of domestically and foreign owned firms.

Table 1 also presents the summary statistics and variable definitions of independent variables. Our investment variable Inv is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets.¹³ The average growth of fixed and intangible assets compared to the prior year's amounts to 9%. We further use information on EBIT ($EBIT$), turnover ($Sales$), wages to employees ($Labor$), and debt ($Debt$). These four variables are scaled by the prior year's total assets. On average, firms in the full sample (matched sample) have an EBIT-to-assets ratio of 9.4% (9.6%), a turnover-to-assets ratio of 242% (223%), a wages-to-assets ratio of 64% (45%), and a debt-to-assets ratio of 61% (52%). We further include the natural logarithm of total assets (average 8.4 and 10.2, respectively) as a measure of firm size, and a dummy variable for loss firms (average 12.3% and 12.4%, respectively).

[Insert Table 1 about here]

4 Empirical Results

4.1 Graphical Evidence

The simplest way of testing our hypothesis is to track the investments of domestic and foreign-owned firms over time. Figure 1 uses the matched sample of firms and plots the investment (Inv) for each group over 2005–2011. We observe a parallel trend in the investments of domestic and foreign firms prior to the reform. Both sets of firms invest about 5% to 10% of their fixed and intangible assets each year. Following the 2008 tax reform, the investments of these two groups diverge. The investments of domestically owned firms exceed those of firms with a foreign parent each sample year. The general trend of both sub-groups reflects the economic downturn. Most important to our study is, however, the relative investment of domestically owned firms vis-à-vis foreign owned firms.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Figure 2 plots the corresponding difference in investment between these two groups (black line). The gray lines indicate the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals. Prior to the

¹³ Our data do not include capital expenditures. Therefore, we use the change in fixed and intangible assets. As further robustness test, we account for depreciation and scaling effects (see Section 4.2).

reform, the difference is below zero indicating that foreign-owned firms invest more. This difference is, however, statistically not different from zero. After the reform, the difference in investment jumps to a higher level. It is positive and significant each post-reform year. That is, domestically owned firms with fewer opportunities for international profit shifting respond much more strongly to the 2008 tax reform than firms with a foreign owner and access to profit shifting. The advantage of the graphical illustration in Figure 2 is that the effect is independent from the business cycle in Germany, since all firms are affected similarly.¹⁴ After the reform, domestically owned firms invest about 5% more than foreign-owned firms. This difference is significant at the 1% level every sample year. The graphical evidence in Figure 2 is a first indication in favor of our hypothesis that investment is responsive to changes in the corporate tax and that investment responses are heterogeneous across firms. Figure 2 also shows that the effect is persistent over time. Differences in investment are statistically not different from each other but are different from zero in each post-reform year. This indicates that the financial crisis (alone) cannot explain our result. If foreign firms are hit to a larger extent by the crisis in 2008 and 2009 than domestic firms, we would have seen a reversal in the difference in 2010 and 2011. As the effect is persistent, we are confident that it is driven by the tax reform.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

4.2 Difference-in-Differences Results

We next test our hypothesis using the difference-in-differences approach. Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates from testing Equation (5). For our baseline tests, we regress investments on the interaction of *Domestic* and *Reform*. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 use the full sample. In Columns (3) and (4), we use the matched sample of domestic and foreign firms. We present the results with and without firm-level control variables. We include year fixed effects and firm fixed effects in all four specifications.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

The estimated coefficient of $Domestic \times Reform$ is positive and significant in all specifications. For the matched sample, which accounts for differences in the economic activities of

¹⁴ In several robustness test below, we relax this assumption and control for different influences of the financial crisis on domestic and foreign firms.

foreign and domestic firms, the coefficient is 0.0592 and is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The economic magnitudes are large: The increase of 5.9% is equivalent to an average increase in investments in fixed assets by €3.0m (or USD 4.2m) for each domestic firm, which averages total assets of €103m (or USD 142m). The coefficient estimate is very similar when excluding firm-level control variables. This shows that firm-level characteristics do not affect our results. In sum, the estimates indicate that a corporate tax cut of 10% can have large investment effects on domestically owned firms.

The results for our firm-level control variables show that investments increase for firms that are more profitable (*EBIT*), that have higher turnover (*Sales*) or that are smaller ($\ln(TA)$). More precisely, for the full sample (matched sample), a one standard deviation increase in EBIT results in 4.0% (3.2%) more investment, a one standard deviation increase in *Sales* results in 8.0% (7.9%) more investment, and a one standard deviation decrease in $\ln(TA)$ results in 63.1% (35.3%) more investment. The latter can be explained by the better growth and investment opportunities of smaller firms.¹⁵ We measure investment relative to existing fixed assets. Therefore, small and high-growth firms have higher investment rates. Investments decrease by about 1.9% (3.5%) if the firm has negative income (*Loss*). We find no significant effect for leverage, and only a weakly significant effect for labor costs.

We test the robustness of our results using an alternative definition of our dependent variable that accounts for potential scaling effects.¹⁶ Instead of using fixed and intangible assets, we scale changes in fixed and intangible assets by total assets. Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates for the difference-in-differences estimator ($Domestic \times Reform$) for the full and matched samples. In line with our hypothesis, we find a positive and significant coefficient estimate for β_1 . For the full sample with controls, the coefficient estimate is 0.0074 (t -stat = 2.06). In the matched sample, β_1 is 0.0098 and significant (t -stat = 2.57). Panel B uses an investment measure where we additionally account for depreciation. We define investment as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets plus depreciation from t to $t - 1$ relative to prior year's fixed

¹⁵ Typically, smaller firms have higher market-to-book ratios, which is a common proxy for growth opportunities. Using the *Datastream* sample of firms around the world, the correlation between $\ln(TA)$ and market-to-book ratios is -0.2940. For German firms, the correlation is -0.2709. This suggests that smaller firms have higher market-to-book ratios and, thus, also higher growth opportunities.

¹⁶ We test the robustness of our firms to the inclusion of small firms and excluded firms below the median of total assets distribution. The results are robust and similar to the baseline estimates. For the matched sample, the coefficient of $Domestic \times Reform$ is 0.0429 and significant (t -stat = 2.38).

and intangible assets. Using this alternative dependent variable does not change our results. For the full sample with controls, the coefficient estimate is 0.0378 (t -stat = 2.15). In the matched sample, β_1 is 0.0555 and significant (t -stat = 2.77).

[Insert Table 3 about here]

4.3 Robustness to the Financial Crisis: Pseudo-Reform Analysis

One main concern about our setting is potential influence of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. If, compared to domestic firms, foreign firms invest less in Germany due to the economic crisis, we may misinterpret crisis effects as tax responses. To test to what extent our results are driven by the financial crisis, we employ our difference-in-differences setting around pseudo-reforms in EU-15 member countries. From these countries we exclude Denmark (due to lack of data availability), Belgium (due to a large tax reform in the pre-pseudo reform period), and countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Spain, and Portugal). For the remaining nine countries, we obtain data from *amadeus*, a database similar to *dafne* expanded to all European countries. We follow the same approach as in Table 2 and estimate the responses to a pseudo-tax reform in 2008 of domestic versus foreign firms in each country. If the financial crisis explains our findings, we would find positive coefficients for $Domestic \times PseudoReform$ in these other EU sample countries.

Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the nine European sample countries. With the exception of Italy, we observe insignificant coefficients for $Domestic \times PseudoReform$ across samples. Two estimated coefficients are positive and borderline significant ($p < 0.1$) and two other coefficients are significantly negative. From the results presented in Table 4, we conclude that domestic and foreign firms in eight EU-15 member states responded similarly in terms of investment to the crisis. This result is independent of size, industry composition, and the institutional setting of the country.

The fact that the coefficient of $Domestic \times PseudoReform$ is positive and highly significant in the case of Italy supports our hypothesis and our findings, since Italy reduced the statutory corporate tax rate in 2008 by 5.5 percentage points.¹⁷ Therefore, our model implications also

¹⁷ Note that Sweden reduced its corporate tax rate by some 1.7 percentage points in 2009. The pseudo-reform partially picks up this tax rate cut; however, the results are insignificant. One possible explanation for this finding is that the tax rate cut was too small to have a material influence on investment decisions.

hold in a different market during exactly the same global macroeconomic conditions. We are confident that the documented effect for German corporations is driven by the corporate tax rate cut and not by the financial crisis.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

4.4 Robustness to Financial Crisis: Economic Development in the Parent Company's Country

Another concern about our estimation strategy is that we cannot identify—and thus cannot control for—the economic situation of the parent firm or group. Put differently, the financial crisis of 2008 and cross-country differences in its effect on GDP growth can potentially affect our results. The difference in investment growth between domestic and foreign companies may be thus influenced by the economic development in the parent country relative to the economic development in Germany. We therefore add the GDP growth rate of the country where the parent is located to our model. This controls for the difference in the economic development in the foreign country. Table 5 presents the regression results.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

The estimated coefficient of the GDP growth variable is insignificant in all specifications for both the full sample and the matched sample. Thus, the economic situation in the parent country has no impact on the subsidiary's investment behavior. Moreover, the sign of the estimated coefficient is negative. In line with Becker and Riedel (2012), the result suggests that weak economic development leads to higher investments in the affiliate's country. Such investment shifting may be due to the expectation of higher returns when investing in a stronger economic environment than in countries in an economic downturn. Related to our case, this implies that foreign firms shift investments to Germany as it was not hit as hard by the crisis as foreign countries. This effect would then actually work against finding evidence in favor of our hypothesis. However, the effect, as indicated by our results, is not significant.

Most important for our study, the impact of the interaction variable *Domestic* \times *Reform* is comparable to the baseline results. The size of the effect is very similar for the matched sample and is still significant at the 1% level. Alternatively, we use mean investments and mean

EBIT (both divided by prior year's total assets) of firms in the parent country (according to the *Datastream* sample) as proxies for the economic development in an untabulated test. The estimated coefficients of mean investments and mean EBIT are insignificant in all specifications. The estimated coefficients of *Domestic* \times *Reform* are significant and comparable to the baseline results. Thus, our result that the investments of domestic firms increase more after the 2008 reform than those of foreign firms is robust to controlling for cross-country differences in macroeconomic development.

4.5 Robustness to the Financial Crisis: Differences in Insolvency Risk

The third crisis-related robustness test controls for potential exit effects and bankruptcies. During the financial crisis and the global economic downturn, firms have faced greater insolvency risk. If this risk differs across the treatment and control groups and if foreign firms are more likely to face insolvency, our coefficient estimate for *Domestic* \times *Reform* may pick up differences in insolvency risk. Therefore, we restrict the sample to firms that have survived at least seven of eight sample years. These firms were active before, during, and after the financial crisis and do not face insolvency due to the financial crisis. Panel A, Table 6 presents the regression results for our β_1 coefficient. The results are robust to the restriction. The coefficient of *Domestic* \times *Reform* amounts to 0.0572, is statistically significant at the 1% level (t -stat = 3.22), and is close to our baseline estimate. When the sample is restricted even further to firms that survive all sample years (Panel B), the coefficient is 0.0563 and significant at the 1% level (t -stat = 3.16). From this, we conclude that our result cannot be explained by differences in insolvency risk across domestic and foreign firms around the financial crisis. In sum, our results show that the corporate tax cut has a stronger investment effect on domestic firms than on foreign firms.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

4.6 Effect of Bonus Depreciations

This fourth robustness test addresses the influence of a subsequent tax change. Because of the financial crisis, the German government allowed bonus depreciation for investments in fixed assets acquired in 2009 and 2010. This provision may have influenced the corporate investments

of German firms in those two years (e.g., House and Shapiro, 2008, for the United States). Our coefficient estimate could be biased if the introduction of the bonus depreciation also led to heterogeneous responses across domestic and foreign firms. To test if these two years explain our results, we estimate the reform effect separately for each year. The regression results are presented in Table 7.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

The estimated coefficients of the yearly interaction variables are not significant for 2008 in the full sample. When using our preferred sample—the matched sample—we observe a positive and significant difference between domestic and foreign firms each sample year. This result is also supported by Figure 2, which shows an immediate and persistent change in the difference in investment. The coefficient estimates are close to each other and range from 0.0407 to 0.0676. Most importantly, the estimates for 2008 (0.0676) and 2011 (0.0582), that is, the two years without bonus depreciation, are significant and close to our baseline estimate of 0.0592 for the entire post-reform period (see Table 2).

According to this yearly breakdown, the investments of domestic firms are significantly higher than those of foreign firms following the corporate tax cut. The effect is not limited to the years 2009 and 2010. Our effect cannot be attributed to the temporary introduction of bonus depreciation for assets purchased in 2009 and 2010. Thus, we conclude that the difference in investment growth between domestic and foreign firms is a consequence of the corporate tax cut. Again, the persistence of the effect shows that it is driven by tax reform and not by other confounding events, such as the financial crisis.

4.7 Effect of the Change in Dividend Tax

We next turn to other reform elements that could potentially affect our results. The 2008 tax reform led to a small increase in the dividend tax rate of zero to 4.5 percentage points through the new partial income method. This change in the dividend tax for non-corporate shareholders could potentially affect the allocation of investments (Alstadsæter and Jacob, 2014; Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013). Since higher payout taxes increase the costs of external equity, this may shift investments from firms without internal resources to companies that can finance themselves internally. That is, the investments of domestic firms may be driven by such

reallocation and a lock-in of capital in firms with high cash. To test whether this mechanism explains our findings, we divide the group of domestic companies into quintiles according to EBIT distribution. EBIT scaled by the prior year's total assets serve as a measure of internal funds available for investments. Splitting this sample into high- and low-EBIT firms allows us to compare the investment levels of German companies with and without internal resources. We are interested in the investment effects on companies in the upper quintile (*High EBIT*) and bottom quintile (*Low EBIT*) of the EBIT distribution around the 2008 tax reform. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. The regression follows Equation (5) but uses the dummy *High EBIT* instead of the *Domestic* dummy. The sample is restricted to German firms.

[Insert Table 8 about here]

The interaction of *High EBIT* and *Reform* is insignificant in three of four specifications. It is only significant in the heterogeneous sample when we exclude firm controls. There are two explanations for the insignificant result: First, the dividend tax change may not apply to all firms. In the case of corporate or institutional shareholders, shareholder taxation does not change around the reform. Second, the increase in dividend taxation for private shareholders is not large. In the top tax bracket of 45%, it amounts to 4.5%. The insignificant result in Table 8 indicates that the observed growth in the investments of domestic firms is not limited to high-EBIT firms. Instead, the investment response stems from the cross section of domestically owned firms. The investment response to the 2008 tax cut, as identified in the baseline regression in Table 2, cannot be explained by the increase in dividend taxes.

4.8 Correction for Serial Correlation in Investment

One final concern about difference-in-differences estimations is serial correlation (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). The difference-in-differences estimate is likely to suffer from serial correlation if the dependent variable is serially correlated and if the treatment indicator variable varies only little over time. Both issues apply to our setting as investments are correlated over time and as our treatment variable is time-invariant. To address these concerns, a simple method is to collapse pre-reform and post-reform sample years. For each firm, we then receive one pre-reform average for the dependent and each independent variable and one post

reform average of each variable, respectively. We then use these averages and run our model based on the collapsed time period. This allows us to include the main effects of *Domestic* and *Reform* since fixed effects are not included in the model.

Table 9 presents regression results using the collapsed sample. The results indicate that the main effect of *Domestic* is not significant. This confirms our graphical analysis from Figure 2 where we observe an insignificant difference in investment prior to the reform. The main effect of *Reform* is negative and significant, suggesting that the economic downturn decreases average investment. Most importantly, the difference-in-differences estimate is significant and close to our baseline estimate. For our preferred specification, the coefficient is 0.0654 and statistically significant ($t\text{-stat} = 4.91$).¹⁸ The analysis in Table 9 shows that our result is not explained by serial correlation.

[Insert Table 9 about here]

5 Conclusion

This paper tests the effect of the 2008 corporate tax cut on firm investment in Germany. Our simple investment model suggests that firms with only limited access to international profit shifting respond more strongly to a corporate tax cut than firms with foreign operations and the opportunity to shift income across borders. We test this expectation in a difference-in-differences setting, which has the advantage of being independent of macroeconomic effects. We find that domestically owned firms respond much more strongly to the tax cut than firms with an ultimate owner in a foreign country. Using pseudo-reform analysis, we can rule out that this effect is driven by the financial crisis. Thus, we conclude that firms' investment strategies are sensitive to corporate tax changes and that the corporate tax rate affects the allocation of investments across domestically and foreign-owned firms.

Our results have several policy implications. Large economies with high tax rates, such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have both a strong domestic market and large multinational corporations. Countries can increase the investments of domestically active corporations by reducing corporate tax rates and thus investment costs.

¹⁸ Including firm fixed effects in the collapsed model does not alter the result. The *Domestic* \times *Reform* coefficient is 0.0600 and statistically significant ($t\text{-stat} = 2.99$).

Conversely, the reactions of firms with foreign operations may be weaker than expected, since they are less responsive to changes in the local statutory tax rate. These heterogeneous investment responses are also relevant for countries with many internationally active firms and a small domestic market. The effect of a corporate tax cut may be weaker than expected in these countries. Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) show that countries with a high share of foreign ownership can export part of their tax burden. Our results imply that this mechanism comes at the cost of lower investments by domestic firms.

The results also point toward differences in the tax sensitivity of firm policies across corporations, which may affect not only investment strategies, but also financing decisions (e.g., MacKie-Mason, 1990; Graham, 1996a,b). Differences in tax sensitivity are closely related to a firm's effective tax rate, which decreases, for example, for companies with foreign operations (e.g., Rego, 2003; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010). Testing the tax responses of domestic versus foreign-owned firms on other business decisions is therefore an interesting avenue for future research.

Finally, the ongoing race to the bottom of corporate tax rates affects not only the location decisions (e.g., Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Buettner and Ruf, 2009; Overesch, 2009) and profit shifting activities of multinational firms (e.g., Clausing, 2003; Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme, 2008), but also the allocation of investments across domestically and foreign-owned corporations. Given that the governments of European Union member countries have recently cut corporate tax rates to reduce profit shifting (e.g., Sweden cut the corporate tax rate from 26.3% to 22% in 2013), the effect of these reforms on corporate investment is a highly relevant empirical question. Our results suggest that firms without access to international income shifting will increase their investment activity following the recent wave of tax rate reductions in the race to the bottom.

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Appendix

We extend our main model and allow $\alpha(\cdot)$ to be a function of τ_{For}^{Corp} and τ_{Dom}^{Corp} . That is, the level of profit shifting of a multinational firm depends on the corporate tax rates in the countries of the subsidiaries. The implications we derived for the simplified model are still valid. Hence, a firm with access to profit shifting invests in a project if

$$r_{Shifting}^* = i \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \tau_{Eff}^{Corp}} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

with

$$\tau_{Eff}^{Corp} = \alpha(\cdot) \cdot \tau_{For}^{Corp} + (1 - \alpha(\cdot)) \cdot \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}$$

and

$$\alpha(\cdot) = \alpha\left(\tau_{For}^{Corp}, \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}\right)$$

From Equation (A.1), we can derive the effect of a corporate tax change on the required rate of return of a firm with the opportunity to shift income (foreign firm):

$$\frac{\partial r_{Shifting}^*}{\partial \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}} = i \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha'(\cdot)(\alpha(\cdot) - \tau_{For}^{Corp})}{1 - \left(\alpha(\cdot) \cdot \tau_{For}^{Corp} + (1 - \alpha(\cdot)) \cdot \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}\right)^2} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Showing that the effect of a corporate tax change on the required rate of return is still larger for domestic firms than for foreign firms is straightforward:

$$\underbrace{i \cdot \frac{1}{\left(1 - \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}\right)^2}}_{\text{Effect on Domestic Firm}} > \underbrace{i \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha'(\cdot)(\alpha(\cdot) - \tau_{For}^{Corp})}{1 - \left(\alpha(\cdot) \cdot \tau_{For}^{Corp} + (1 - \alpha(\cdot)) \cdot \tau_{Dom}^{Corp}\right)^2}}_{\text{Effect on Foreign Firm}} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

The necessary condition is that $\alpha'(\cdot) \geq 0$ and $\alpha'(\cdot) \leq 1$. That is, the proportion of profits shifted abroad is either unaffected by the domestic tax rate ($\alpha'(\cdot) = 0$) or increases with the domestic tax rate ($\alpha'(\cdot) > 0$). If we assume that $\alpha(\cdot)$ is a logistic function that takes on values between zero and one ($0 \leq \alpha(\cdot) \leq 1$ and $0 \leq \alpha'(\cdot) \leq 1$), the effect of a tax cut on domestic firms is larger than on foreign firms.

Figure 1: Average Investment: Domestic versus Foreign-Owned Firms

This figure plots the average investments of domestic firms (black line) and foreign-owned firms (dashed line). Investment is defined as the percentage change in fixed and intangible assets from $t - 1$ to t . The dashed vertical line separates the pre-reform from the post-reform years.




Figure 2: Difference in the Investments of Domestic and Foreign-Owned Firms

This figure plots the difference in investments between domestic firms and foreign-owned firms (black line). Investment is defined as the percentage change in fixed and intangible assets from $t - 1$ to t . The gray lines are the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of the difference. The vertical line separates the pre-reform from the post-reform years. The dashed horizontal lines indicate average difference in investments between domestic firms and foreign-owned firms before and after the reform.




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

This table presents the summary statistics and variable descriptions of our variables. The full sample comprises 36,072 firms and 93,856 firm-year observations. The matched sample uses 4,000 firms and 18,140 observations. If not otherwise indicated, the data source is the *dafne* database. *Inv* is our investment measure. It is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. *Domestic* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate owner is located in Germany. *EBIT* is the ratio of EBIT relative to the prior year's total assets. *Sales* is turnover relative to the prior year's total assets. *Labor* is the ratio of wages to the prior year's total assets. *Debt* is the ratio of long-term and short-term liabilities to the prior year's total assets. $\ln(TA)$ is the natural logarithm of total assets. *Loss* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if $\text{income} < 0$. *GDP Growth* is the percentage point growth in GDP from $t - 1$ to t in the country where the ultimate owner is located. Source: World Bank.

Variable	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	Mean	Std Dev.	Mean	Std Dev.
Dependent variable				
<i>Inv</i>	0.125	0.602	0.087	0.472
Independent variables				
<i>Domestic</i>	0.829	0.376	0.51	0.5
<i>EBIT</i>	0.094	0.153	0.096	0.141
<i>Sales</i>	2.416	1.892	2.234	1.669
<i>Labor</i>	0.64	0.663	0.446	0.454
<i>Debt</i>	0.606	0.394	0.518	0.326
$\ln(TA)$	8.383	1.976	10.15	1.518
<i>Loss</i>	0.123	0.328	0.124	0.329
<i>GDP Growth</i>	1.512	3.234	1.417	3.062
<i>TA (in €1,000)</i>	34,200	264,602	102,850	523,063
<i>FA (in €1,000)</i>	17,540	199,047	51,414	411,313

Table 2: Investment and the 2008 Tax Reform

This table presents the regression results on firms' investment policies over 2005–2011. The dependent variable is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t-1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. The independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic \times Reform	0.0356** (0.017)	0.0364** (0.017)	0.0584*** (0.018)	0.0592*** (0.018)
EBIT $_{t-1}$		0.2583*** (0.042)		0.2243*** (0.066)
Sales $_{t-1}$		0.0425*** (0.007)		0.0471*** (0.013)
Labor $_{t-1}$		-0.0447* (0.025)		-0.0687 (0.051)
Debt $_{t-1}$		0.0119 (0.021)		0.011 (0.037)
Ln(TA) $_{t-1}$		-0.3192*** (0.021)		-0.2327*** (0.034)
Loss $_t$		-0.0187* (0.010)		-0.0349** (0.017)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	93,856	93,856	18,140	18,140
R-squared	0.503	0.514	0.287	0.301

Table 3: Investment and the 2008 Tax Reform—Alternative Dependent Variable

This table replicates Table 2 but uses the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's total assets (Panel A) and the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets plus depreciation from t to $t - 1$ relative to prior year's fixed and intangible assets (Panel B) as dependent variable. The independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

<i>Panel A: Scaling by Total Assets</i>				
	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic×Reform	0.0070* (0.004)	0.0074** (0.004)	0.0094** (0.004)	0.0098** (0.004)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	93,856	93,856	18,140	18,140
R-squared	0.489	0.511	0.321	0.345
<i>Panel B: Accounting for Depreciation</i>				
	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic×Reform	0.0363** (0.018)	0.0378** (0.018)	0.0535*** (0.020)	0.0555*** (0.020)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,294	48,294	15,443	15,443
R-squared	0.448	0.464	0.334	0.348

Table 5: Investment and the 2008 Tax Reform, Controlling for GDP Growth

This table presents the regression results on firms' investment policies over 2005–2011. The dependent variable is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. We add a control for growth in GDP in the ultimate owner's country. The control variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic \times Reform	0.0368** (0.017)	0.0375** (0.017)	0.0590*** (0.018)	0.0596*** (0.018)
GDP Growth $_t$	-0.0035 (0.004)	-0.0031 (0.003)	-0.0031 (0.004)	-0.0025 (0.004)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	93,657	93,657	18,045	18,045
R-squared	0.503	0.514	0.287	0.301

Table 6: Investment, the 2008 Tax Reform, and Firm Survival

This table replicates Table 2 but restricts the sample to firms that survived at least seven sample years (Panel A) or all eight sample years (Panel B). The dependent and independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

<i>Panel A: Firms that Survived at Least Seven Sample Years</i>				
	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic×Reform	0.0312* (0.017)	0.0331** (0.017)	0.0558*** (0.018)	0.0572*** (0.018)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	92,002	92,002	17,986	17,986
R-squared	0.498	0.509	0.281	0.295
<i>Panel B: Firms that Survived All Eight Sample Years</i>				
	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic×Reform	0.0315* (0.017)	0.0321* (0.017)	0.0571*** (0.018)	0.0563*** (0.018)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	82,592	82,592	16,790	16,790
R-squared	0.487	0.499	0.275	0.290

Table 7: Investment and the 2008 Tax Reform, by Year

This table replicates Table 2 but presents regressions results, which estimate the reform effect separately for each year. The dependent variable is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. The independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic \times 2008	0.0256 (0.021)	0.0261 (0.021)	0.0663*** (0.026)	0.0676*** (0.025)
Domestic \times 2009	0.0514** (0.020)	0.0488** (0.020)	0.0668*** (0.023)	0.0650*** (0.022)
Domestic \times 2010	0.0420** (0.021)	0.0425** (0.020)	0.0415* (0.024)	0.0407* (0.024)
Domestic \times 2011	0.0250 (0.020)	0.0304 (0.020)	0.0537** (0.024)	0.0582** (0.023)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	93,856	93,856	18,140	18,140
R-squared	0.503	0.514	0.288	0.301

Table 8: Effect on the Allocation of Investments

This table presents the regression results on firm investment policy over 2005–2011. We use domestic firms only. We include firms in the top and bottom quintiles of the EBIT distribution as a measure of internal resources. The dependent variable is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t - 1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. The dependent variable of interest is the interaction between high-EBIT firms and the reform dummy ($HighEBIT \times Reform$). The control variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High EBIT \times Reform	-0.0648** (0.031)	0.0487 (0.034)	-0.0113 (0.047)	0.0698 (0.053)
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,804	14,804	2,825	2,825
R-squared	0.438	0.455	0.303	0.319

Table 9: Investment and the 2008 Tax Reform—Collapsed Model

This table presents the regression results on firms' investment policies over 2005–2011. The dependent variable is defined as the difference in fixed assets and intangible assets from t to $t-1$ relative to the prior year's fixed and intangible assets. The independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report the regression results for the full sample and a matched sample. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), all variables are included as the pre-reform and post-reform average for each firm to control for serial correlation. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

	Full Sample		Matched Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Domestic \times Reform	0.0387*** (0.011)	0.0197* (0.011)	0.0680*** (0.014)	0.0654*** (0.014)
Domestic	0.0283*** (0.009)	0.0151 (0.009)	-0.0131 (0.011)	-0.0115 (0.011)
Reform	-0.0486*** (0.010)	-0.0290*** (0.010)	-0.0443*** (0.011)	-0.0244** (0.011)
Mean(EBIT)		0.3645*** (0.021)		0.3246*** (0.038)
Mean(Sales)		-0.0003 (0.001)		-0.0023 (0.003)
Mean(Labor)		0.0122*** (0.002)		0.0049 (0.003)
Mean(Debt)		0.0295*** (0.004)		0.0114 (0.010)
Mean(Ln(TA))		0.2387*** (0.010)		0.1546*** (0.018)
Mean(Loss)		-0.0623*** (0.010)		-0.0274* (0.017)
Observations	54,976	54,976	7,451	7,451
R-squared	0.002	0.056	0.004	0.044

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